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The reasons for this crisis are varied and complex. The crisis can be
attributed to a number of factors pervasive in both the housing and
credit markets, which developed over an extended period of time.
Some of these include: the inability of homeowners to make their mortgage payments, poor judgment by the borrower and/or the lender, speculation and overbuilding during the boom period, risky mortgage products, high personal and corporate debt levels, financial innovation that distributed and perhaps concealed default risks, central bank policies, and regulation (or lack thereof).
Boom and bust in the housing market
A combination of low interest rates easy credit for many years leading up to the crisis. Subprime borrowing was a major contributor to an increase in home ownership rates and the demand for housing. The overall U.S. home ownership rate increased from 64% in 1994 (about where it was since 1980) to a peak in 2004 with an all-time high of 69.2%.
This demand helped fuel housing price increases and consumer spending. Between 1997 and 2006, American home prices increased by 124%. Some homeowners used the increased property value experienced in the housing bubble to refinance their homes with lower interest rates and take out second mortgages against the added value to use the funds for consumer spending. U.S. household debt as a percentage of income rose to 130% during 2007, versus 100% earlier in the decade. A culture of consumerism is a factor "in an economy based on immediate gratification".
Overbuilding during the boom period eventually led to a surplus inventory of homes, causing home prices to decline, beginning in the summer of 2006. Easy credit, combined with the assumption that housing prices would continue to appreciate, had encouraged many subprime borrowers to obtain adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) they could not afford after the initial incentive period. Once housing prices started depreciating moderately in many parts of the U.S., refinancing became more difficult. Some homeowners were unable to re-finance and began to default on loans as their loans reset to higher interest rates and payment amounts.
An estimated 8.8 million homeowners — nearly 10.8% of total homeowners — have zero or negative equity as of March 2008, meaning their homes are worth less than their mortgage. This provides an incentive to "walk away" from the home, despite the credit rating impact.
Increasing foreclosure rates and unwillingness of many homeowners to sell their homes at reduced market prices have significantly increased the supply of housing inventory available. Sales volume (units) of new homes dropped by 26.4% in 2007 versus the prior year. By January 2008, the inventory of unsold new homes stood at 9.8 months based on December 2007 sales volume, the highest level since 1981. Further, a record of nearly four million unsold existing homes were for sale, including nearly 2.9 million that were vacant.
This excess supply of home inventory places significant downward pressure on prices. As prices decline, more homeowners are at risk of default and foreclosure. According to the S&P/Case-Shiller price index, by November 2007, average U.S. housing prices had fallen approximately 8% from their Q2 2006 peak and by May 2008 they had fallen 18.4%.
The price decline in December 2007 versus the year-ago period was 10.4% and for May 2008 it was 15.8%. Housing prices are expected to continue declining until this inventory of surplus homes (excess supply) is reduced to more typical levels.
Speculation
Speculation in real estate was a contributing factor. During 2006, 22% of homes purchased (1.65 million units) were for investment purposes, with an additional 14% (1.07 million units) purchased as vacation homes. During 2005, these figures were 28% and 12%, respectively. In other words, nearly 40% of home purchases (record levels) were not primary residences. NAR's chief economist at the time, David Lereah, stated that the fall in investment buying was expected in 2006. "Speculators left the market in 2006, which caused investment sales to fall much faster than the primary market."
While homes had not traditionally been treated as investments like stocks, this behavior changed during the housing boom. For example, one company estimated that as many as 85% of condominium properties purchased in Miami were for investment purposes. Media widely reported the behavior of purchasing condominiums prior to completion, then "flipping" (selling) them for a profit without ever living in the home.
Some mortgage companies identified risks inherent in this activity as early as 2005, after identifying investors assuming highly leveraged positions in multiple properties.
Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky described three types of speculative borrowing that can contribute to the accumulation of debt that eventually leads to a collapse of asset values: the "hedge borrower" who borrows with the intent of making debt payments from cash flows from other investments; the "speculative borrower" who borrows based on the belief that they can service interest on the loan but who must continually roll over the principal into new investments; and the "Ponzi borrower" (named for Charles Ponzi), who relies on the appreciation of the value of their assets (e.g. real estate) to refinance or pay-off their debt but cannot repay the original loan.
The role of speculative borrowing has been cited as a contributing factor to the subprime mortgage crisis.
High-risk loans
A variety of factors have caused lenders to offer an increasing array of higher-risk loans to higher-risk borrowers. The share of subprime mortgages to total originations was 5% ($35 billion) in 1994, 9% in 1996, 13% ($160 billion) in 1999, and 20% ($600 billion) in 2006.
A study by the Federal Reserve indicated that the average difference in mortgage interest rates between subprime and prime mortgages (the "subprime markup" or "risk premium") declined from 2.8 percentage points (280 basis points) in 2001, to 1.3 percentage points in 2007. In other words, the risk premium required by lenders to offer a subprime loan declined. This occurred even though subprime borrower and loan characteristics declined overall during the 2001–2006 period, which should have had the opposite effect. The combination is common to classic boom and bust credit cycles.
In addition to considering higher-risk borrowers, lenders have offered increasingly high-risk loan options and incentives. These high risk loans included the "No Income, No Job and no Assets" loans, sometimes referred to as Ninja loans.
Another example is the interest-only adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), which allows the homeowner to pay just the interest (not principal) during an initial period. Still another is a "payment option" loan, in which the homeowner can pay a variable amount, but any interest not paid is added to the principal. Further, an estimated one-third of ARM originated between 2004 and 2006 had "teaser" rates below 4%, which then increased significantly after some initial period, as much as doubling the monthly payment.
The Center for Responsible Lending, in its report on IndyMac, related testimony that the bank actually made efforts to avoid having income information about some borrowers. The Associated Press has reported that a federal grand jury is investigating subprime lenders Countrywide Financial Corp., New Century Financial Corp. and IndyMac Bancorp Inc. and reports also that the FBI is investigating IndyMac for possible fraud. The question, then, is whether banks and other private mortgage originators of subprime and other "nonprime" loans might deliberately have profited or attempted to profit - in moneys, economic benefit or even fraudulent gain - through reducing the amount of information they collected from borrowers.
Judge Leslie Tchaikovsky of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, found on 25 May 2008 that even though a pair of borrowers had, indeed, misrepresented their incomes on a "stated income" home equity loan, National City Bank's "reliance" on these statements of income "was not reasonable based on an objective standard".
The banking industry provided home loans even to undocumented immigrants. It is legal for illegal immigrants to purchase property in the United States. The pro-immigrant experts like Tim Ready at the University of Notre Dame argued that "It's really important to the economy as a whole and to the real estate market in particular that Latinos be able to purchase a home." Banks, including some major institutions, offered home-mortgage loans to people who don't have Social Security numbers.
Securitization practices
Securitization is a structured finance process in which assets, receivables or financial instruments are acquired, classified into pools, and offered as collateral for third-party investment.
There are many parties involved. Due to securitization, investor appetite for mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and the tendency of rating agencies to assign investment-grade ratings to MBS, loans with a high risk of default could be originated, packaged and the risk readily transferred to others. Asset securitization began with the structured financing of mortgage pools in the 1970s.
The traditional mortgage model involved a bank originating a loan to the borrower/homeowner and retaining credit (default) risk. With the advent of securitization, the traditional model has given way to the "originate to distribute" model, in which the credit risk is transferred (distributed) to investors. The securitized share of subprime mortgages (i.e., those passed to third-party investors) increased from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006.
Alan Greenspan stated that the securitization of home loans for people with poor credit — not the loans themselves — was to blame for the current global credit crisis.
Some believe that mortgage standards became lax because of a moral hazard, where each link in the mortgage chain collected profits while believing it was passing on risk.
Inaccurate credit ratings
Credit rating agencies are now under scrutiny for giving investment-grade ratings to securitization transactions (CDOs and MBSs) based on subprime mortgage loans. These high ratings encouraged the flow of investor funds into these securities, helping finance the housing boom. Higher ratings were believed justified by various credit enhancements including over collateralization (pledging collateral in excess of debt issued), credit default insurance, and equity investors willing to bear the first losses. Critics claim that conflicts of interest were involved, as rating agencies are paid by the firms that organize and sell the debt to investors, such as investment banks. On 11 June 2008 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposed far-reaching rules designed to address perceived conflicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers of structured securities.
Rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on $1.9 trillion in mortgage backed securities from Q3 2007 to Q2 2008. This places additional pressure on financial institutions to lower the value of their MBS. In turn, this may require these institutions to acquire additional capital, to maintain capital ratios. If this involves the sale of new shares of stock, the value of existing shares is reduced. In other words, ratings downgrades pressure MBS and stock prices lower
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